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SECTOR SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE POSTWAR




This paper attempts to look at Philippine postwar growth within
a comparative framework, using as.a background the record and
experience of other Asian countries, particularly the. experience of
other ASIEAN countries. When we speak of a country's growth per-
formance as good or bad, we are almost always (implicitly or ex-
plicitly) resorting to comparisons with the performance of other
countries or with the past performance of the country in question.
I know of no theory of economic growth which can supply us with
normative standards by which a country can be evaluated. And it is
best to compare with Asian countries whose stage of development
and whose environmental and other conditions of growth are..bas.i-
cally tied to the monsoon - the distinguishing characteristic of
Asian countries from that of the West, Middle East, Latin America,
or Africa. Within monsoon Asia, the neighboring, countries of Thai-
land, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan come closest to Philippine
conditions, leaving out Hong Kong and Singapore as city-states.with-
out an agricultural sector. Moreover, it is not the absolute level of
efficiency, say in production, that is relevant, but the efficiency rela-
tive to-neighbors which is important for exporting. 1
Growth is used in the technical sense, referring to long-term,
secular trends (as defined by Kuznets 1966). The ultimate aim in
Visiting Professor,School of Economics, University of the Philippines. I am
grateful for the extensive discussionat the secondgeneralmeeting of the Philip-
pine Society for International Development, where an earlier version of this
paper wasfirst presented. In particular, the comments of Dr. Estanislaoof the
Center for Researchand Communications and Mr. Samsonof the National Eco-
nomic and Development Authority's National Account Staff were very helpful.
Someof the points madeare consideredin this revisedversion.
I. For example, the Philippines, located near a dynamic growth area such
as EastAsia (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong) and the huge U. S.
market, should havebeen more fortunate than Sri Lanka, located nearrelatively
stagnant India, Bangladesh,Burma, and Africa, This is true for traditional ex-
ports such assugar,coconut, and the like; but Wasthe Philippines lucky to be
surrounded by countries with industrial entrepreneursso strongly imbued with
Confucian ethics?
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this type of analysis is to single out long-run sources,forces, and
mechanisms underlying the trends, assuming that the impacts of
short-run forcesmaking for upsand downs of annual (and even de-
cennial) GNP per worker (such as bad weather, inflation, oil price
increases,and so on) largely cancel out in the longer-term averages.
After separating out the short-term forces, we ask: what are the
long-run sources and mechanisms which underlie the trend of
GNP, GNP per worker, structural change, income distribution, and
so on, and to what extent can insightsin identifying the sources(as
distinct from causes)be obtained through similarities and contrasts
in the growth experience of other Asian countries, particularly
Southeast Asian ones?But this being mainly a broad macrostudy,
the sourcesidentified are to be regardedaspreliminary and tentative,
subjectto more detailed scrutiny by micro researchefforts. As such,
like most macrofindings, they are mainly setsof statementsfor fur-
ther research into the basic long-run forces influencing the trends.
These forces take much researcheffort to identify for each nation.
The identification of sector sourcesof growth is not just an aca-
demic exercisewithout current policy relevance. For the low growth
of productivity in many industries over decadesmay underlie the
low growth of profits and therefore of savingand investment in the
• industriesconcerned; this in turn may lead to low growth of pro-
ductivity in later decades.Or the low growth of productivity may
leadto the stagnation of realwagesand employment contributing to
tension, social unrest, and poorly motivated manpower, and these
to low productivity in later decades.Both may contribute to sluggish
exports and poor government revenue collections, cumulating in
chronicbalanceof payments and budget deficits.
A systematic study of the seculargrowth of any country starts
with the overall macrotrends of the major GNP accountingvariables
and then goes into the major sectors of the economy to trace the
sourcescontributing to or retarding growth. For this, we needto get
into the subsectors to learn more about the detailed sectors' per-
formance. Finally, the paper looks into the consequences of the rate
and the pattern of growth on structural changes,income distribution,
savings,and other variables.It goeswithout stressingthat the system-
atic study of the seculargrowth of any country is a major research
undertaking requiring decadesof work by a large group of Scholars.
Even after the requisite data are assembled,their interpretation isOSHIMA:SECTOR SOURCES OFPHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 3 ,
likely to continue on for decades.2
In the subsequent three sections,an attempt is madeto look
more closely at the subsectors before some of the consequences are
discussed. These discussions are carried out primarily from the point
of identifying areas for more detailed research as the next step in the
study of Philippine postwar growth. The final section will speculate
about forces underlying the trends, as a starting point in the formula-
tion of hypotheses for the detailed studies.
The paper utilizes a number of studies of the Philippine economy
which have been published in the past few years, most of which will
be mentioned in the various parts of this paper. In particular, it will
be based on a group of studies at the University of the Philippines
School of Economics funded by the PIDS over the past couple of
years (coordinated by the present writer), dealing with the long-term
productivity of the Philippine economy and its different sectors.
These studies are as follows: Aurora Sanchez, Philippine Capital
Stock Measurement and Total Factor Productivity Analysis, forth-
coming Ph.D. dissertation; jose A. Bulao, The Growth of the Govern-
ment Services Sector in the Philippines (1946-1976), Master's thesis,
1981; Beneva G. Lacsamana, The Postwar Economic Growth of
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, 1981; Lucia C. Laquindanum, The
Postwar Growth of Labor Productivity in the Manufacturing Indus-
tries, 1981; Filipinas S. Echavez, Output Growth and Structural
Changes in Postwar Philippine Manufacturing, 1982; and, in the pro-
cess of completion, Cayetano Paderanga, Demand Sources of Econ-
omic Growth in the Philippines, and Astrid Manuel, Total Factor
2. In the study of Japan, it took a couple of decadesby dozens of re-
searchers to compile the data to establishthe varioustrendsin her growth. (The
data are now publishedin a dozen or so volumes.)The interpretation of the
trendscontinues,asindividualscholarscome up with freshinsights, particularly
when Japanese trendsare comparedwith thoseof other countriesin the West
and in the East. The Philippinesisfortunate in that a numberof studieshave
been completed in the 1960's, particularly thoseof Vernon Ruttan, Randolph
Barker, Cristina David, Richard Hooley, and many others.Asia isfortunate in
that Simon Kuznetsof Harvard,the leading scholaron seculargrowth, began
promoting long-term researchin Japan,Taiwan, Korea, China, and India, as
well as in the West. Under his and MosesAbrarnovitz's coordination,studies
for leadingWesterncountrieswere started in the mid-1960's, some of which
havenow been published(K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovskyfor Japan, Malinvaud
and Associatesfor France, R. C. O. Matthews and Associatesfor the U.K.,
and soon M. Abramovirz and P. David for the U.S., followed by studiesfor
Germany,Sweden,and Italy).4 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Productivity in Philippine Agriculture. It needs to be stressed that
the kind of macro data we deal with .in this study are.approximate
and ofuneven quality (see Appendix Note). Small changes in the
trends are not to be taken.seriously and even larger.changes should
not be taken to be.definitive.
II. THE RECORD OF.PHILiPPINE GROWTH IN ASIAN
PERSPECTIVE
In Table 1 are assembledthe estimatesof the growth of GDP per
capita in constant prices for the countries of monsoon Asia with
long-term data. (Pakistan is excluded from the table as it is predo-
minantly a wheat-growing country). 3 Generally speaking, the esti-
mates for EastAsia are more reliable than those of Southeast Asia,
and the latter's estimatesare better than those of South Asia for
various reasons. 4 The growth of per capita GDP in constant prices
was lower for the Philippines(3.1 percent) during the three postwar
decades than in any of the countries of East and .Southeast Asia
shown in the table, but the Philippines did better than any of. the
South Asian countries. The Philippines hada fast start in the 1950's,
registering the. highest growth rate in Southeast Asia (even higher
-than for South Korea), in part due tothe relatively smooth transition
from colonial status to.independence compared to Malaysia. strug-
gling.with a full-scale Communist rebellion, Indonesia plagued with
instabilities as a result ofthe aftermath of the war of independence,
and South Korea devastated by the.K0rean war and slowed down by
reconstr'uction. The pace of Philippine growth failed to keep up with
all these countries in the .1960's and 1970's, averaging below 3 per-
cent compared to 4 percent or better for the others...Although the
Philippines registered levels of per capita incomes higher than those
of Thailand and South Korea and about equal to those of Taiwan in
3.Rice eatersin Pakistan. comprise only 30 percentof the population-
not only lower thanmonsoonAsia'stwo-thirdsbut evenlower thanAfrican
andLatinAmericancountries'one-half.SeeIRRI (1982,p.5).
4. Themainreasons forthisarethatthecensuses, surveys, andothersources
of informationformingthebases for computationare.morenumerous, andthe
qualityof thedataandinformationis betterfor EastAsianthanfor Southeast
Asia,andthat for the.latter betterthanfor SouthAsia.For the samereasons,
in all.thecountries,generally speaking, the datafor the 1970'$are.betterthan
for the 1960's,andbetterfor 1960'sthanfor the1950'S.Forfurther discussions
of these estimates, seeOshima(1977).OSHIMA:SECTOR SOURCES OFPHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 5
TABLE 1.
• GROWTH RATESOF GDP PERCAPITA IN ASIAN COUNTRIES
(Geometric ratesin percentperyear)
19S0-60 1960-70 1970-80 1950-80
EastAsia Simpleaverage 4.6 7.5 5.9 5.9
Pop.weightedaverage 5.1 7.9 4.3 5.6
1980& GDPweighted ave. 6.1 9.4 4.4 6.5
Japan 6.6 10.1 4.1 6.9
China(l) 5.0 (2) 7.8 (3) 4.1 5.4 (4)
SouthKorea 3.1 6.0 8.0 5.7
Taiwan 4.0: 6.3 6.7 5.7
HongKong 4.5 7.2 6.4 6.0
SoutheastAsiaSimpleaverage 2.1 3.8 5.4 4.0
Pop. weightedaverage 2,3 2.8 5.2 3.5
1980 & GDP weightedave. 2,3 3;! 5.2 3.7
Malaysia 1.0 3.3 5.3 3.2
Thailand 2.8 4.7 5.1 4.2
Indonesia 1.9 2.3 :5.7 3.3
Singapore 1.3 (7) 6.7 7.7 •6.2 (5)
Philippines 3,6 2.2 3.4 3.1
Southeast
SouthAsia(6) Simpleaverage 2.2 1.5 1.1 1.5
Pop.weightedaverage 2.0 2.0 1.1 1_7
1980 &GDP weightedave. 2.0 2.1 1.2 1.7
india 1.9 2.2 1.2 1.8
Bangladesh - 1.1 0.3 0.7 (5)
Burma 4.3 1.2 1.2 2.2
Sri Lanka 1.3 2.5 2.3 2.0
Nepal 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.7
Sources: IBRD World Tables 1980 updated by IBRD World Development
Report 1982. Singapore'sdata in the 1950% which is taken from Appendix
Table 1 of Oshima,H. T. "Growth and Unemploymentin Singapore", Malayan
Economic Review, (October1967).
Notes: (1) Net materialproduct per capita,(2) 1949-62, (3) 1-962-70,(4) 1949-
80, (5) 1956-80, (6) Pakistannot includedin South Asia becauseit doesnot
belong to MonsoonAsia, (7) 19S6-60. Chinesefiguresin this and other tables
may be revised when th0 pooulation and employment data from the 1982
Census(thefirst modernpopulationcensus for China)arecompletelytabulated:6 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
the early 1950'_, it had fallen far behind the last two and wascaught
up with by Thailand in the early 1980's.s
A 3 percent growth rate is roughly the trend rate at which the
dozen or so industrialized countries of the West grew in the past
century, and by this standard the Philippinesdid well enoughduring
the past three decades.Of course, the industrialized countries grew
in a century when, for the most part, capital was extremely scarce
and difficult to borrow; foreign aid nonexistent or negligible, and
when the new technology and correspondingnew institutions had to
be innovated asthey went along.If we take the period 1902 to 1980
(omitting the war-related decade of the 1950's), GNP per capita
for the six decadesof the twentieth century is 2 percent, signifi-
candy lower than the 3.3 percent of the industrialized countries for
the comparable period. The 3 percent for the postwar decadesis
the same as the world GDP per capita which we computed for the
period 1955-80 from population and GDP data from various issues
of the UN 5tetistical Yearbook. In sum, the Philippine postwar per-
formance is an average one by world standards, above average by
South Asian, below average by Southeast Asian, and far below East
Asian, standards.
If we ask, what sectors were responsible for the relatively low
growth of the Philippines in the three decades, we find from the
World Bank's tables in its World Development Reports that the
growth of income or product contributed by (or originating in)
the A sector (farming, fishing, livestock and forestry) was4.2 percent
per year in the period 1950-80; in the I sector (mining, manufac-
turing, construction, public utilities) it was 7.3 percent; and in the
S sector (commercial, personal and public services, transport 'and
communication), 5.8 percent. The overall growth rate of GDP
was 6.0 percent which comes to 3.1 percent per capita GDP per
year for the period 1950-80 (as shown in Table 1), with the growth-
rate of population at2.9 percent per year.
The growth rate of agricultural products in the 1950's in the
Philippines of 3.3 percent is lower than that of Thailand , China,
Taiwan, and South Korea, but higher than that of Indonesia(which
wasstruggling with problems of independence and unification in the
1950's), Malaysia (involved in putting down the Communist rebel-
5. For theearly 1950's,see 'UnitedNations(1957).In a paperto becom-
pletedsoon,we examinehowThailandwith one-halfof Philippineincomes in
thebeginning wasabletocome upto Philippine levels threedecades later.OSHIMA: SECTOR SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 7
lion), and Japan (whose agricultrual development reacheda satura-
tion point in the mid-1950's). Moreover, the growth of industrial
product was the lowest for the 1960's and 1970's in SoutheastAsia
and in East Asiaand lowest for three decadesexcept in relation to
Malaysia (preoccupied by the Communist rebellion in the 1950's).
Similar resultsare indicated for the servicesector whosetrends tend
to movecloselywith the agricultural and industrial sector.
A most striking aspect of Philippine growth is the slow growth
of real product per worker as shown in Table 2 for the 1960's
and 1970's.6 The Philippine growth rate of 1.7 percent wasone-half
that of the averageof ASEAN countries and only one-third of East
Asia. it is even lower than the 2.6 percent of india and Sri Lanka.
Thus, the relatively low growth of GDP percapita in the Philippines
among East and Southeast Asiancountries is closelyassociatedwith
the very low growth of labor productivity in the Philippines, the
only measure of the growth of efficiency we have for most Asian
countries.
It seemsto me wrong to dismissthe relation between product
per capita and product per worker as a tautology (asone discussant
emphasized). In Kuznets's theory of growth, it is the growth of
productivity due to technological and institutional changesthat is
related to the growth of product per capita. Then, it is the latter
through varying income elasticities of demand and other forces
which islinked to structural changesand which in turn raisesproduc-
tivity. Thus, it is the high growth of product per worker in Japan,
Taiwan, and Korea which is related to the high growth of product
per capita, making possible in large part the low income inequality
and high personal savings(in Japan and Taiwan). And it is the low
growth of product per worker in China (2.1 percent in the 1960's
and 1970's compared to 6 percent growth of product per capita)
and in the Soviet countries that is the most worrisome problem
faced by nearly all the planning authorities in the Southeast coun-
tries. The failure to raiseproduct per worker calls into question the
entire viability of socialism in the long run. But in the industrialized
Western countries also, the fall in product per worker in the past
decade and a half has contributed to their present predicament,
As Moses Abramovitz of Stanford University has pointed out, in
the first half of the postwar era the growth of product per worker
6. Employment dataarenotavailable for the1950'sin mostof theSouth-
eastAsian countries.• TABLE 2
GROWTH RATES OF REAL PRODUCT PER WORKER IN ASIAN COUNTRIES
(Geometric rates,in percentperyear) oo
A-Sector . I-Sector
• 1960-70 1970.79 1960-79 1960-70 1970.79 1960-79
EastAsia Simpteaverage 3.6 4.5 4.0 6.6 " 3.8 5.3
Pop.weightedaverage -0.3 3.1 !.1 6.9 2.0 4.9
1980 & GDP weighted
ave. 4.6 6.7 5.6 8.3 3.6 6.2
Japan . 6.2• 8.0 7.1 8.9 4.0 6.6
China -1.3 (1) 2.5 0.3 (2) 6.7 (1)• 1.5 4.6 (2)
South Korea 1.8 3.2 2.5 7.9 5.8 6.9
Taiwan . 3.2 4.1 3.6 6.6 4.8 5.7
Hong Kong 8.3 4,9 6.7 2.8 3:0 2.9
Southeast Asia Simple average 5.0 3.6 4.4 3.4 3.3 3.3
Pop. weighted average 2.8 r 2.5 2.6 2'0" 3.7 2.8
1980 &GDP weighted C
• = "11
ave. 3.6 2.9 3.2 2.5 3.5 3.0 Z
MaLaysia 6.1 4.1 5.2 4.9 3.1 4.0 3>
r-
Thailand 4.3 5.7 5.0 4.4 • . 0.5 2.6 0
Indonesia 1.9 2.3 2.1 1,2 4.6 2.8 -n
"I0
•.Singapore 10.1 6. 7 8. 5 5.3 4,3 4.8 -r
Philippines 2.6 1.5 2.1 1.0 4.6 2.7 D
"O
• "10
South Asia Simple average 2.3 0.4 1.4 5.2 1.3 3,4 -_
Pop. weighted average . 2.9 0,4 1,7 5,4 1.I 3.4 n1
1980 & GDPweighted O • . m
ave: 2.9 0.4 .1.7 5.4 1.1 3,4 <
Ill
India 2.9 0.4 1.7• • 5.4 1.1 3.4 .. r-
Sri Lanka " 1.6 0.3 1.0 4.9 1.5 3.3 O "g
nl
Notes: A Sector includes agriculture, forestry and fishery; ISector includes mining, manufacturing,.construction, electricity,. Z
gas and water, and transport, storage and _mmunication. Data on GDP and ¢nlployment•for sectors are not available for --4
most Southeast Asian countries. Even the overall GDP estinlates are poor since censuses and surveys were not conducted
in the early 1950's. (1) 1957-70, (2) 1957-79.Table 2 (Continued)
O
S-Sector Whe_e Economy "I"
1960-70 1970-79 1960-79 1960-70 1970-79 1960-79
3_
r._
EastAsiaSimple average 4..8 3.1 4.0 5.3 4.1 4.7 m
Pop. weightedaverage 2.3 0.6 1.6 Z8 2.6 2.7 o
1980& GDPweighte¢l
av. 5.8 2.2 4,] 7.3 3.8 5.7 c_
Japan 7.0 2.4 4.8 8.8 4.1 6.6 0 C
China 1.6 (l) 0.i 1.0 (21 1.9 (1) 2.3 2.1 (2) -n 0
SouthKorea :5.2 4.8 S.0 5.8 S.0 5.4 m
• 03
Taiwan 2.4 3.7 3.0 5.4 4.1 4.8 O
Hongkong 7.6 4.7 6.2 4.7 4.8 4.7 -n
"r
•Southeast AsiaSimpleaverage 2.5 1.7 2.1 3.5 3.3 3.4 F
Pop.w_ghtedaverage 1.0 0.9 0.9 2.3 3.5 2.7
1980&GDPwei_ted __
ave. 1.5 1.2 1.4 2.8 3.4 3.0 m
"O
Malaysia 3.4 2.9 3.2 4.4 3.8 4.1 0
f.O
Thailand 5.1 1.4 3.3 4.4 4.0 4.2
Indonesia 0.3 0.6 0.4 1.7 4.2 2.6•
Singapore 5.5 3.0 4.3 5.7 3.7 4.8 "n
Philippines - 1.9 -0.7 - 1,3 1.4 2.1 1.7 C_ ;0
0
SouthAsiaSimpleaverage 4.6 1.7 3.2 3.9 1.2 2.6 -]
Pop.,keighted average 4.9 0.7 2.9 4.3 0.8 2.6 -i-
1980& GDPweigheted
ave. 4.9 0.7 2.9 4.3 0.8 2.6
India 4.9 0.7 2.9 4.3 0.8 2.6-
Sri Lanka 4.2 2.6 3.4 3.5 1.6 2.6
Sources: Employment datamainlyfromILO YearbookofLabourStatistics, productdatafrom IBRDWorldTables1980
andsupplemented byvarious officialpublications onnational accounts andemploymenL
Notes:SSectorincludes commerce andservices. ForChinaI Sectorincludes _onlymanufacturing, mining andpower;SSector '.O
includes.consUuction, tTanspoct, commerce andnonmaterial services. (1) 1957-70,(2)195"/-79.10 JOURNAL OF. PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
exceeded the growth of product per capita in the U.5, but in the
second half the reversehappened, as a consequenceof which the
risein public welfare expenditures per capita c()uld not be paid for,
leavinghuge deficits in all the government budgets of the industrial-
ized countries (Abramovitz 1981). The problem faced by socialist
plannersis even more seriousbecausein the earlier half of the post-
war era the increase in product pr capita was largely due to the
increasein the female participation rate which now appearsto have
reached limits which could not be exceeded any further. For the
Philippines likewise, the low growth of product per worker (1.7
percent in the 1960's and 1970's) compared to the growth of
product per capita (2.8 percent) has relevance for the present crisis
which has been more serious than in any other Asian countries
aswill be discussedbelow.
Per capita product is also important because it is also closely
associated with per family product growth. This is because the
averagefamily size does not change very much. In the 1960 Census,
it was 5.8 and, despite the upsurge of population, it rose slightly to
5.9 in the 1970 Census and in the 1975 Census.This implies that
population and number of families move slowly together (3 percent
and 2.8 percent from 1960 to 1975, respectively); thus, per capita
income increased at about the same pace as per family incomes
(if not somewhat slower). This is important asthe analytical approach
of this paper is focused on family incomes, which also is convenient
for the analysis of family income inequalities.
It would have been better to useGDP power worker per capita
(or conventional total factor productivity) since capital can be
thought of as "congeaLed" labor, but estimates on capital stock are
not available except for Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. As part
of the PIDS project mentioned above, Sanchez (forthcoming, pp.
63-64), after estimating capitalstock for the Philippines, compared
the growth of total faGtor productivity with that of South Korea.
She finds that total productivity in the Philippines has grown at a
slow and unspectacular rate (1.1 percent) when compared with
Korea's total factor productivity growth rate of 4.1 percent per
year during the period 1960-73. Even larger differences are found
when comparisons are made with Taiwan (5.4 percent in 1952-69)
and japan (4.9 percent in 1953-71). 7 (And our tentative finding is
7. Taiwan'sestimates are found in Koo (1971) and Japan'sestimates
arefrom Denison andChung(1976).Wehaveupdated them.OSHIMA: SECTOR SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 11
that total factor productivity in the Philippines grew substantially
slower than in Thailand.)
The low growth of labor productivity may be partly the result
of large numbers of underemployed workers, particularly in the
rural areas;and if the data existed for the other countries, we might
have computed full-time equivalent employment in the calculation
of labor productivity. For the Philippines, we present two variants
of labor input: one, full-time equivalent, and the other, male labor
input in agriculture (since the female labor input varies considerably
in the different seasons- high during transplanting and harvesting,
making it difficult to define female employment in agriculture).
Using Professor Linda Tidalgo's estimates of full-time equivalent
for the period 1957-78, we get a slightly lower growth rate of labor
productivity, 1.6 percent (for the A sector it is lower, for the S
sector higher, and for the I sector we get the samefigure). But which-
ever estimate is used there is little doubt that Philippine product-
ivity performance was in general poor in comparison with East
Asia and Southeast Asia. It is therefore low growth of productivity
that we must focus on in trying to understand the nature of the
relatively low growth of per capita GNP.
Since we do not have capital stock data for other Asian coun-
tries, gross capital formation (or investment) is about the only proxy
we can fall back on. The rationale of this is that, over long periods
of time, most of the initial capital stock wears out or becomes
obsolete and must be replaced by the annual capital formed. Table
3 sets forth the available capital formation data for various Asian
countries. Although the Philippines hasdone better than the South
Asian countries as a whole, its investment per worker for the two
decades is below that of East Asia and Southeast Asia, and some-
what higher than that of Thailand and Indonesia. More important,
the increase in the 1970's over 1960's is smallest for the Philippines
in [=-astand Southeast Asia. Thus, the low growth of labor produc-
tivity may be partly related to the insufficiency of investment by
entrepreneurs.
Data for pre- and postwar comparisons are shown in Table
The prewar data are of poorer quality than the postwar, althoug[I
unlike any other country in Asia, the Philippines was fortunate if_
having very comprehensive censusesof population, agriculture indus-'
try, commerce, and so on (under supervision of U. S. statistical ex-
perts) in 1902, 1918, and 1938. These were the major sourceson
which Richard Hooley (1968) basedhis pioneerwork on total factorTABLE 3
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN POSTWAR ASIA
Region/country (in billions of currency ofeachcountry) • Ave. Per Change
Averageper year Change Average per year in Average per worker worker perworker
1960% 1970% 1970160 millions of.U.S. $ 1960% 1970% 1960'sand 1970/1960
(percent) 1960% 1970% 1970% in local
in dollars currencies
(percent)
EastAsia 4,194.6 8,638.6 206 49,542 116,745 126,602.4($530.8) 242,099.4($907.8) $ 719.3 191.2
Japan 15,810.831,906.8 202 43,919 107,507 323,329.2(898.1) 568,748.7(1866.6) 1,382.4 175.9
•Korea 929.7 2,557.5 275 4,355 6,1•88172,166.7(720.7) 381,716.4(922.2) 821.5 221.7
Taiwan 35.5 85.8 242 888 2,258 9,342.1(233.6) 15,600.0(402.1) 317.9 167.0
Hang Kong 2.2 4.2 191 379 792 1,571.4( 270.9) 2,333.3(440.2) 355.6 148.5
Southeast Asia 156.1 494.1 317 6,630 12,704 4,806.7($211.3) 1i,919.6($414.1) 312.7 248.0
Malaysia 1.8 3.6 200 588 1,406 562.5 (181.5) 857.1 (317.4) 249.5 152.4 C
Thailand 27.3 45.1 165 1,313 2,200 1,88Z8(90.1) 2,592.0(125.8) 108.0 137.7 m z
Indonesia 741.7 2,403.9 324 2,186 5,793 19,467.2(136..1) 51,585.8(127.0) 131.6 265.0 > • i-
Singapore 0.8 2.8 350 261 1,134 1,333.3(430.1) 3,500.0(1346.2) 888.2 262.5 O
Philippines 8.9 15.2 171 2,282 2,t71 787.6(218.8) 1,062.9(154.0) 186.4 135.0 " • "O
South Asia 13.0 18.8 145 9,075 11,422 218.4 ($ 37.0) 242.6 ($28.1) 32.6 111.1
India 57.1 86.1 151 7,613 10,373 274.8 ( 42.3) 352.9( 43.6) 43.0 128.4 r"
Sri Lanka 1.3 1.8 138 260 298 342.1 (64.5) 400.0 (44.4) 545 116.9
Bangladesh 5.1 3.8 75 911 447 242.9 ( 43.4) t42.3 ( 14.8) 29.1 58.6 m z
Burma 1.1 1.2 109 231 190 101.9 ( 2t.2) 103.4( 18.1) 19.7 101.5 o
Nepal 0.6 1.2 200 60 114 130.4 (13.4) 214.3(t9.8) 16.6 164.3 ,_ m
Source: All data fTom.IBRD World Tables 1980. _)
"0
Notes: (1) Data for 1960% are average of 1960 and 1965-69; data for 1970% are average of 1970-77. (2) Regional averages m
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TABLE 4
AVERAGE GROWTH RATES OF THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY:
1902 to 1980
(Geometricratesin percentper year)
1902-38 1950-60 1960-70 1970.80 1960-80 1950-80
Population 2.1 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.9
Employment 2,6 2.2 3.3 4.0 3.6 3.2
Agriculture 2.6 0.8 1.5 3.3 2.4 1.9
Industry 2.6 7.0 3.9 3.9 3_9 4.9
Services 3.6 7.2 5.6 6.4 5.5
GNP (constantprices) 3.0 6.5 5.1 6.3 5.7 6.0
Agriculture 2.5 3.3 4.3 4.9 4.6 4.2
Industry 7.1 6.0 8.7 7.4 7.3
Services 3.5 6.9 5.2 5.4 5_3 5.8
GNP percapita 0.9 3.6 2.0 3.5 2.8 3.1
GNP perworker 0.4 4.3 1.8 2.3 2.1 2.8
Agriculture -0.1 2.5 2.8 1.6 2.2 2.3
Industry 0.1 2.1 4.8 3.5 2.4
Services 0.9 3.3 -2.0 -0.2 -1.1 0.3
Total FactorProductivity -0.4 -1.6
Agriculture -0.4 1.3
Nonagriculture --0.3 - 2.0
Notes and Sources:Estimatesfor 1902-1938: population estimatesfrom various
issues of PhilippineStatisticalYearbook;employment from 1903 and 1939 cen-
susesof population; all other estimatesare from Hooley (1968, pp. 72-74);
Hooley's estimatesfor nonagriculture are for manufacturingonly. Wehaveused
Hooley's estimates for agriculture for 1902-1938 insteadof the more recent
Barker-Davidestimatesin Agricu/tural Growth in Japan, Taiwan,Korea an_
Philippines, edited by V. Ruttan, Y. Hayami, and H. Southworth, Honc"
1979, p. 119, becauseas noted by the authors(on p. 118), the OUtputestimI,
for 1902 were abnormallylow because of the Philippine-American War,drou 1
and disease.The Barker-Davidestimatesgivea growth rate of total factor p_
ductivity of 4 percentfor the 1902-1938 periodwhich seemsinconceivablefor
any country's agriculturalgrowth especiallyfor the prewardecades when bio-
logical, chemical, and mechanicaltechnologiesin agriculture were relatively14 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
primitive. In the prewar decades,even for the rapidly growingagricultureof
Japan,Taiwan, and Korea, total factor productivity was lessthan 2 percent
( Barker and David 1979, p. 17). Prewartrendsin rice productionfrom the
1918 to the 1938 censuses of agricultureextendedbackwardto 1902 indicate
that Hooley's output growth assumptionmay be more appropriatethan the
figuresfrom the 1903 _nsus (for the year 1902).
Estimatesfor postwaryearsare official estimatestaken mainly from the
NEDA Philippine Statistical Yeorbooh, 1979 and 1982 issues. Since employ-
ment data areavailableonly from 1956 onwards,we usethe 1948 censusdata
from ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics to derivethe growth rate of employ-
ment in eachsectorto interpolatefor the earlier yearsof 1950. From October
1956 to August1976 the NCSO employmentdata are basedon laborforce 10
yearsand over; thereafter, the concepthaschangedto that of laborforce 15
years old and over. We bridgedthe two seriesby extrapolatingAugust 1976
data of the former conceptwith data for the third quarter 1.976of the new
conceptto obtaindata for 1977-79.
Total factor productivity for the whole economyis computedfrom Table
2.4 of Aurora Sanchez's Philippine Capital Stock Measurement and that for
agriculture from Astrid Manuel's Total Factor Productivity. Total factor pro-
ductivity for nonagricultureis obtained as the weighted difference between
the first two figures.The weightingfactor is computedby averagingthe share
of nonagriculturein total national product in constant prices for the years
1960, 1970, and 1975. A postwartotal factor productivity - 1.6 percent is
obtained from Aurora Sanchez's.Table 2.4, usingthe conventionalmethod
of estimation and with full-time equivalent,accelerateddepreciationvariant_
This is lower than the figure of 1.1 percentcited earlier which is estimated
using the refined method basedon Christensen,Cummingsand Jorgenson's
approachto TFP measurement (Table2.3 of Sanchez).
productivity in the Philippines. s It is disappointing to find that the
total factor productivity growth rate for the economy as a whole
for the postwar decades showed little or no improvement from the
8. Hooley'sfiguresare indispensable for an understanding of the long-term
growth of the Philippinesin the three postwar decades.With new sourcesof
informationmadeavailablein the Philippinenationalarchives in the late1960's,
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prewar decades,being close to zero.9 The rise in agricultural total
factor productivity may be attributable to the introduction of new
biological/chemical/hydrological/mechanical technologies, to the
expansion of land saving multiple cropping systems counteracting
the extension of cropping into new, less fertile areas,and perhaps
to institutional improvements (in land tenure, in delivery of credit,
extension, water, and in the rise of large-scalepoultry, fishery,
livestock enterprises. See further discussion below). Output per
worker is higher for the postwar than for prewar decades. Never-
theless, it is somewhat disappointing that the increasesin product-
ivity in the postwar decadesare so small despite the vast changes
that have occurred in the postwar over prewar decades(political
independence, rapid technological advance and investment growth,
export expansion, and accelerated public expenditures for growth-
promoting activities such as education, industrialization, rural
development, transportation, communication, construction, and
so on). (See note on public finance below.) Philippine experience
contrasts sharply with the substantial productivity gains in East
Asian countriesin the postwar over prewar decades.
The foregoing discussionis highly aggregative, since the pro-
cedure is to start from the most macroscopicdata to the less.Before
we begin to look into each sector and subsector,a brief summary of
the analytical approach may be useful. The framework used in this
paper is based mainly on the growth experience of Japan, Taiwan,
and South Korea.1° We start with the overwhelmingly important
agricultural sector (which in the early 1970's comprised 70 percent
of the total Philippinelabor force). It wasthe rapid growth of annual
real farm family incomes - faster than the growth of the labor
force - in Japan in the 1950's, in Taiwan in the 1960's, and in
documentation andanalysis.Forsecular growthanalysis weusethedataonly
for the 1902-1938periodsincetheperiodfrom1938to 1948wasbeset with
warandreconstruction.
9. Thisestimate of productivity isfrom Sanchez (forthcoming) calculated
by the conventional method whilethehigherestimate of 1._1 percentisby the
refined method(translog). The latter is usedin comparison with Korea's
estimates whicharemadeby therefinedmethodandtheformerincomparison
withconventional prewar estimates.
10. Presented in detailin my "Modelof EastAsian GrowthandStructural
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South Korea in the 1970's that was largely responsible for their
attaining long-run full-employment levels of economic growth,
besides expanding the exports of labor-intensive manufactures. The
sources of the rapid growth of farm family incomes were rising
yields (including diversification) and crops per hectare and income
from off-farm employment (and only minimally, area expansion).
Farm family incomes rose to equal the family incomes of nonfarm
workers. The increase in the former expanded the demand of peas-
ants for agricultural inputs and consumption goods, contributing
to the expansion of manufacturing output, economies of scale and
externalities, all of which in turn raised efficiencies in the labor-
intensive industries which sold to local and foreign markets. 11 (The
rise in peasant expenditures was especially large because tile growth
in incomes was accompanied by their more equal distribution.)
Without the rise in annual• productivity of the farm labor force,
wages and returns to peasants would not rise and prices per unit
of farm products would be high, reducing their home (and also
foreign) demand as in the case of Taiwan. Moreover, full employ-
ment and rising wages started the process of mechanization of
agricultural operations, thereby raising output per worker and
releasing workers to urban industries. 12
III AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT•
Data on agricultural family incomes are not available for the
1950's and 1970's. For the 1960's, data from the Family Income
and Expenditure Surveys of NCSO show that the real agricultural
family incomes rose at an annual rate of only 0.2 percent compared
to the growth rate of the labor force of 2.3 percent•. Agricultural
family incomes averaged little less than one-half of nonagricultural
family incomes in the 1961 and 1971 survey. With real agricultural
11. South Korea'sexperiencewassomewhatdifferent. Farm family incomes
rosefaster than the laborforce but not as muchas in Japanin the 1950's and
Taiwan in the 1960's and full employment was reachedwith a spectacular in-
creasein labor-intensive exportsin thelatter 1960'sandearly 1970's.
12. This process of developmentisjust the oppositeof the__ewis andother
modelsof dualism.I haveexaminedthe Lewismodelin a paperin the Malayan
Economic Review, October 1981, the Ranis-Fei model in the American Eco-
• nomic Review, June1963, and in theJourn¢l of Political Economy, June1958.OSHIM.A:SECTORSOURCESOF PHILIPPINE POSTWARGROWTH 17
product in the 1970's rising at 4.9 percent (compared to 4.3 percent
in the 1960's) but-agricultural employment acceleratingto 3.3 per-
cent in the 1970's (1.5 percent in the 1960's; seeTable4), the much
•faster rise of employment over product per worker of 1.6 percent
(= 4.9 -- 3.3) implies that the annual growth of real agricultural
family incomes in the 1970's did not improve over the 1960's, unless
the nonagricultural income component of agricultural families acce-
lerated to make up for the shortfall of agricultural incomes - an
unlikely event as will be seenin the discussion of the industrial and
service sector. 13 Data on nonagricultural incomes of farm families
are available only in the 1965 and 1971 surveys. These show that
they comprise only about one-third of incomes from agricultural
activities (compared to 100 percent for Japan in the 1950's and for
Taiwan in the 1960's).
There are four •sources of income related to the slow growth
of agricultural family incomes which could be quantitatively traced
to: (I) the income from more crops grown in a given plot or multiple
cropping, (2) more nonagricultural incomes during slack seasons,
(3) increased yields•per hectare, and (4) new lands•brought into culti-
vation. Item (2) has been touched on above; the other three will be
discussedbelow.
Data on the use of farmland for two or more crops (multiple
cropping) can be estimated for the years in which there is a census
of agriculture with data on the total crop area. This can then be com-
pared with the Ministry 0f Agriculture's data on total crop area
harvested in a year. From the censusesof 1948, 1960, and 1971 the
multiple-cropping ratio is computed as 1.24, 1.461and 1.40, respect-
ively. 14 Taiwan had a peak of 1.90 in 1966 when she reached full
employment, after which the ratio declined slowly due to the lack
13. This section may be revised with the availabilit_ Zof data on farm family
incomesfrom the 1975,•1977, 1978,and 1980 surveys. The datapublished
earlierfrom the1975surveyarebasedona handtabulatedsmallsample of the
1975surveywhichnow hasbeenfully tabulatedand isaboutto bepublished.
Similarly reviseddata from the 1975 surveyon rural/urbanfamily incomes
maybecome available soon.
14. These arefromthetablesof AstridManuel's TotalFactorProductivity
in PhilippineAgriculture. Datafor 1981willbeknownwhenthe1981Census
of Agricultureis published. Because of the expansion of irrigationfacilities,
some increase incropping ratiosisto beexpected.18 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
of surplus labor on the farms. Similarly, in Japan (a temperate
country with cold winter months), the index reached 1.50 in the
mid-1950's and then began to decline slowly after full employment.
The multiple-cropping ratio is thus a function not only of irrigation
facilities but also of the number of months of warm weather and
the extent of rural surpluslabor. The ratio could beconsiderably
higher for the Philippines if irrigated water and electricity were
more extensively available (sincethe cheaper electric pumps instead
of diesels could be purchased). Many of the second crops in the
Philippines are lower-value crops (compared to Taiwan) such as
sweet potato, corn, sorghum, mongo, peanuts,and so on, and crops
of low yield suchasbroadcast rice, asthey depend on the moisture
from the occasional rains during the tail-end of the rainy seasonin
November and December.is
The other sources of agricultural family incomes are the size
of crop areasand their averageyields. Except for agricultural census
years, data on yields and crop area are available only for crop area
harvested which includes not only new land but also multiple-
cropped areas. Table 5 presentsdata on real product or income
originating per hectare of harvested area from 1967 to 1980. Real
income from each of the major crops is found in the national
accounts from 1967, and we divided into it the area harvested to
arrive at a concept of net output per hectare of major crops as
a proxy for the growth of output per worker. Becausethe peasants
work on more than one crop per year, it is not possibleto allocate
those employed in agriculture to each crop, nor even to allocate
them between crop growing and fishing, livestock, forestry, etc.
And data on manhours required per crop area are available only
for a few crops for recent years.16 This concept differs from yields
per hectare harvestedsince it excludescurrent inputs suchas fertil-
izers, insecticides,water charges,seedcosts,and so on, and includes
subsidies. Also, the incomes in the numerator include returns
from multiple-cropped lands and the denominator is acreagehar-
vested;hence, the growth rateof real product originatingper hectare
: 15. See the SpecialIssueon Multiple-Cropping in Asian:Development,
Phi!/ppineEconomicJourne/,Nos.1 and2, 1975;seepapers onthePhilippines
by D.A. Carandang andA. Gomez.
16. It isalsowidelyknownthattherearevarious limitations to thelabor
forceandemployment concepts whenapplied to Asianagriculture. ThisisnotOSHIMA: SECTOR SOURCES OFPHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 19
TABLE 5
PHILIPPINES: REAL INCOME OR PRODUCTORIGINATING PER
HARVESTED AREA (in HECTARES), AGRICULTURAL CROPS,
Total andBy SelectedCrops
Total Other
Crops Palay Corn Coconut SugarcaneBanana crops
1967 808.5 772.9 323.9 459.8 2,591.5 2,863.8 1,682.7
1968 820.0 807.3 360.8 428.8 2,610.7 2,748.1 1,678.8
1969 821.0 807.3 376.8 372.8 2,393.6 2,946.7 1,758.1
1970 870.4 898.4 370.7 414.6 2,693.3 3,163.3 1,704.4
1971 901.3 891.2 352.8 467.7 2,805.7 2,994.3 1,947.9
1972 944.4 845.9 415.8 543.4 2,415.0 2,469.2 2,553.2
1973 978.3 909.8 407.2 479.1 2,436.3 2,819.5 2,559.8
1974 974.4 896.5 392.7 346.3 2,794.0 4,296.5 2,624.2
1975 1,040.7 947.8 401.0 497.9 2,533.6 5,417.9 2,576.6
1976 1,053.1 948.5 380.7 570.0 3,076.9 4,693.7 2,324.6
1977 1,075.8 1,068.9 408.7 488.9 2,369.5 5,790.2 2,314.5
1978 I, 130.5 1,073.6 446.6 460.2 2,743.6 7,218.7 2,476.5
1979 1,182.2 1,138.1 427.7 424.1 3,027.5 6,659.5 2,829.3




rate 3.5% 3,3% 1.9% 0.3% 1.4% 8.7% 4.7%
Sources: Hectare data from NEDA, Statistical Coordination, National Accounts
office; income data from Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1979 and 1981. Hec-
tares represent harvested area. Other crops include mango, pineapple, other
fruits, root crops, vegetables,potatoes, beans,coffee, peanuts,tobacco, abaca,
rubber, etc.20" JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
in Table 6 inclUdes incomes from multiple-cropping. For total crops,
the growth rate is 3.5 percent per year from 1967 to 1980, much
higher than agricultural product per worker (in Table 2). 17
It is int_erestingto note the great differential in real product per
hectare between the major crops, corn (1.9 percent, coconut (0.3
percent), sugarcane (1.4 percent), and rice (3.5 percent), on the one
hand, and banana (8.7 percent) and other crops (fruits, root crops,
vegetables, and nonfood crops, 4.7 percent), on the other. The
growth rate of rice takes into account subsidies, and for product-
ivity purposes unsubsidized income originating is relevant. (Most of
.the increase in rice yields came in the 1970's partly in responseto
the land reform andpartly due to new seedsand modern inputs.)
Thus, the productivity Of Philippine agriculture can be raised
substantially if the sluggards and laggards among the major crops
are made more productive. And this conclusion is supported by the
yield per hectare data computed from the FAO Production Year-
book. Rice yields between 1952/1956 and 1978/1980 have grown
slower than in Indonesia though faster than in Thailand (where
there are large areasdevoted to flooded rice which cannot usehigh-
yielding varieties and modern inputs) and in West Malaysia (which
had to use lower yielding but short-duration varieties for the rapid
expansion of multiple-cropping). In sugarcane, yields have been
falling, and in coconut, yields per hectare have been rising by 1.1
percent per year only; comparative data for other countries are
not yet available.
As for the noncrop sector of agriculture , there are no direct
data on productivity for reasonsalluded to in footnote 16 regarding
the irregularity of employment. But if we take as a rough proxy
the 3.5 percent for the productivity growth rate of the total crop
sector (in Table 5) and compare it with the 2.1 percent for the
only becausemosthousewives work partof the yearin the fields but alsobe-
causethe youngestand the oldestfamily helpers alsowork part-timeduringthe
busyseasons and eventhe adultmales spendpali of theirtimein nonagriculture
and idleness. For further discussion, seethe SpecialIssueon LaborAbsorption
in East andSoutheast Asia,PhilippineEconomicJournal,Nos.1 and2, 1976.
17. Theagriculturalsector,besides crops,includeslivestock,poultrY,fishery,
andforestry,whichon the average comprised43 percentof valueaddedin the




GROSS VALUE ADDED IN AGRICULTURE, FISHERY AND FORESTRY BY INDUSTRY GROUP .;
(In million pesos at constant 1972 price) ._
03
Annual
growth Rates Percent contribution to growth of
Weighted 1967-801970-80 Gross value added in A Sector
¢.




Agricultural Crops 6,881 7,787 14,975 .5758 6.2 6.8 3.500 (75.8%) 3.9463 (81.0%) c_ O
Palay 2,393 2,797 I,I 69 .1818 4.4 4.1 .7999 (17.0%) .7454 (15.3%) -a
Corn 699 897 1,426 .0587 5.6 4.7 .3287 (7.0%) .2759 ( 5.7%} -u a:
Coconut including copra 837 781 1,31 3 .0569 3.5 5.3 .1992 ( 4.2%} .3016 (6.2%)
Sugarcane 800 986 11,322 .0604 3.9 3.0 .2356 (5.0%) .1812 (3.7%) -u
Banana 6t4 744 2,402 .0730 11.1 li.4 .8103 (17.2%) .9052 (18.6%)
Other Crops 1,538 1,582 4,343 .1450 8.3 10.6 1.2035 (25.5%) 1.5370 {31.6%) m "O
O
Non-crop Asriculture 6,171 6,947 8,720 .4241 2.7 2.3 1.1391 (24.2%) .9249 (19.0%) _1
Livestock 1,772 1,761 1,837 .1043 0.3 0.4 .0313 (0.7%) .0417 (0.9%)
Poultry 628 6T4 _t,633 .0558 7.6 10.2 .4244 (9.0%) .5692 (11.7%) :_
Fishery 1,934 2,590 3,864 .I629 5.5 4.t .8960 (19.0%) .6679 (13.7%)
Forestry 1,837 i,982 1,386 .1011 -2.1 -3.5 .2123 (4.5%) .3539 (7.3%)
Gross Value Added in
A Sector 13,052 14,734 23,695 1.000 4.7 4.9 4.7091 (t00%} 4.8712 (100%)
Sourcesand notes:Official national accountdatafrom NEDA Philippine Statistical Yearbook,1979 and 1982 editions.
Contribution to growth of grossvalueadded of A SectoriscOmputed by multiplying theaverage weightof eachminor
industry to itsannum growth rate of value added. I,a2? JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
growth of real product per agricultural worker in Table 2, the dis-
crepancy between the two rates may be roughly indicative of the
slow (or even negative) growth of productivity in fishing (the largest
sector), livestock, and forestry. AccordingLy,it .was the failure of
productivity growth of the major crops (rice, corn, coconut, and
sugar) and perhapsof fishing and forestry which accounts for the
slow growth of agricultural family incomes. 18 In the 1980's, ways
of speedingup the growth of agricultural family incomesby dealing
with the problems of the laggingand sluggishsectorsshould top the
priorities for development. Only then could the growth rate of
agricultural family incomes be raised to equal that of the labor
force, without which full employment and accelerated mechaniza-
tion of small (but numerous) peasantfarms cannot take placein the
1980%. Or perhaps another way would be to expand the nonagri-
cultural incomesof farm families with rural industrialization. (Also,
there is the need to diversify away from rice, sugar,coconut and
other mainstays to higher value crops, asTaiwan and Thailand did
in the 1960% and 1970%.)
IV. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
The industrial sector may be divided into two sectors, manufac-
turing and nonmanufacturing, the latter comprisingmining, utilities,
construction, transport and communication. The nonmanufacturing
industriescontributed as much to GDPas did manufacturing indus-
tries in the early 1950%; this shareslowly declined to two-thirds that
of the latter in the late 1970%. This is largely becausethe agricul-
tural sector is.an important user of the output of the nonagricul-
tural sector (besides urban consumers, manufacturing and service
18. Available datafor thenoncrop sector aretoodeficient forproductivity
estimation. Butasallthreesectors expand theirproduction theymaybeforced
to usepasture land,forestry,andfisheries whichareless productive andfertile.
The consensus among fisheryexpertsappears to bethat,in Philippine waters,
productivityper fishermen may begoingdownas the morecapital-intensive
_awlersincrease theircatchat the expense of the smallbutnumerous fishing
boats,underconditions of fallingfisheryresources. The dataareinadequate,
but in-the 1970%valueaddedin constant prices rose4.3 percent whilethe
numberof licensed fishermen rose6.8 percent andthe numberemployed in
fisheryrose4.1 percentfrom 1971to 1976.(NEDAStatistical Yearbookand
NCSOdatafrom laborforcesurveyworksheets.) A similar situation mayhold
forforestry aslogscome fromremoteforests wherethe costs oftransport may
risesubstantially.OSHIMA: SECTOR SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 23
enterprises); and the larger the agricultural sector, the greater is
the importance of nonmanufacturing to manufacturing in the earlier
stagesof development.
It is best to forego the temptation to think of manufacturingas
the "leading sector" or the "engine of growth" in developmentplan-
ning for economieswhich are predominantly agricultural.19 For the
efficient growth of sucheconomies,the main (though not the only)
function of the industrial sectorshouldbe supportiveof agricultural
development. In predominantly agricultural economies,it isthe in-
creasein agricultural incomesand output which triggers the growth
in the demand for food, textiles, footwear, household and other
consumer products (all of which overwhelmingly dominate manufac-
turing output) and which suppliesthe main inputsto the main manu-
facturing sectors. It is the commercialization and modernization of
agriculture which expand the demand not only for chemicalsand
equipment but also for construction, transport, storageand public
utilities. One important function of industriesin Supportingthe rise
of agricultural family incomes is as a source of industrial employ-
ment to farm families, as the experience of japan in the 1950's and
1960's and of Taiwan in the 1960's and 1970's clearly demonstrates.
Householdsurveysshow that real urban incomesbetween•1956/
57 and 1971 roseby only 0.6 percent per year, which is only one-
third of rural family incomes.This wasthe result of a faster rise in
•the number of urban families (2.5 percent) overaggregatereal family
incomes (1.9 percent). The slow growth of the latter was the out-
come of an insufficient rise in real income per worker in industry
(1.0 percent in the 1960's) and a fall in the service sector (-1.3
percent;seeTable 2).
Tables 6 and "/ presenta computation of realoutput perworker
in manufacturing (in firms with five or more workers) by Filipinas
S. Echavez and in nonmanufacturing by Lucia C. Laquindanum
(1981). There was a growth of 1.1 percent in nonmanufacturing
and 0.3 percent in manufacturing industriesbetween 1956 and 1979.
19. In my paper "Problems of HeavyIndustrialization inAsia,"Philippine
Reviewof Economicsand.Buslness, March1983,I notethatin IndiaandChina
thereisa growing consensus that itwasaserious mistaketoshiftfromemphasis
on agricu_turaJ development to industrial development in the latter 1950's.
Agriculture wasthe leadingsectorin thosecountries in the first halfof the
postwarera; in Thailandand Malaysiaagriculture predominated duringthe
1960'sand1970's.TABLE 7




1956 1966 1974 1956-66 1966-74 1956.74
Food 25.5 •38.2 34.8 4.1% - 1.3% 1.7%
Texlile 22.5 15.5 9.6 - 3.7 - 5.8 -4.6
Wearingapparel 13.3 12.3 1•3.2 - 0.8 0.9 -0.1
Leather 36.4 10.8 7.5 -11.4 -4.5 -8.4
Wood andwoodproducts • 18.5 17.1 11.8 -0.8 -4.5 -2.5
Furniture and fixtures 2.2 4.8 12.8• 8.1 13.0 10.3
Paperand paper products 20.4 27.7 ••29.6 3.1 0.8 2.1 c
Printingndpublishing 1.6 0.8 15.7 -6.7 45.0 13.5 -n Z
Cilemicats 79.6 57.9 111.0 -- 3.1 8.5 1.9 3>
- it-
Rubber 48.0 40.4 61..5 -i.7 5.4 1.4 o
"11
"U
Nonmetallicmineral 30.6 35.8 18.9 1.6 -7.7 - 2.6 3:
Basicmetaland metalproducts 13.7 12.2- 17.6 - 1.1 4.7 1.4 ._r"
Iron and steelandother:basicmetals 58.5 32.7 17.9 -5.6 -7.3 -6.4 -o
Machinery 18.1 33.9 23.1 6.5 -4.7 1.4 z m
Electricalmachinery 177.8 56.9 21:1 - 10.8 -11.7 -11.2 o m
Transportequipment 54.2 33.6 46.3 -4.7 4.1 -0.9 < m
I-
O
Sources and notes:ALldata arefor establishments with 5 or moreworkers.Value addeddatafrom AppendixE.1 of Filipina -_
S. Echavez,Output Growth and StructuralChange.InPostwarPhilippineManufacturing.Employment datafrom 1979 m
NEDA PhilippineStatisticalYearbook(basedon Annualsurveyof Establishments). zOSHIMA: SECTORSOURCESOF PHILIPPINE POSTWARGROWTH 25
The slow rise in real income per worker in industries wasmainly the
result of a nearly stagnant productivity in manufacturing and second-
arily due to the slow growth in nonmanufacturing. In both Sectors,
the growth of productivity was uneven, with some of the subsectors
doing better than the others, as in the agricultural sector. In non-
manufacturing, public utilities performed poorly with -1.7 percent
growth, construction did better with a positivegrowth of 1.8 per-
cent, while miningand transport productivity stagnated.
In manufacturing, Echavez estimates real output per worker in
five groups of industriesfor 1956-74. Productivity growth rateswere
as follows: in food, tobacco, and beverages,2.4 percent; in textiles,
footwear, garments, leather and leather products, -3.4 percent; in
wood, wood products, paper, paper products, printing and publish-
ing, rubber and rubber products, 1.0 percent; in chemicals, petro-
leum, and metallic minerals, - 1.3 percent; all others including basic
metals, machinery, transport equipment,-2.7 percent; and for the
entire manufacturing sector, 0.3 percent. The 1977 Annual .Survey
of Manufacturing presentsvariousdata from 1956 to 1974. Compu-
tation of value added (in current prices) per worker for heavy indus-
tries gives a growth rate of 4.3 percent and for light industries, 7.2
percent (Echavez 1982, Table V.2, p. 76).20 If these ratesin current
prices are deflated by the implicit price indexfor the manufacturing
sector as a whole (from the national accounts including firms with
less than five workers), 9.9 percent, both growth rateswill become
negative. The poor performance in productivity of the capital-inten-
sive industries is surprising because,under the infant industry argu-
ment, experience, learning-by-doing, scale and external economies,
etc., should improve productivity over time in the capital-intensive
industries much moreso than in the light industries.
In Table 7, using the more detailed estimates of Echavez, we
find that the following industries were largely responsible for the
low growth of manufacturing productivity: textiles (-4.6 percent),
leather (-8.4 percent), wood (-2.5 percent), nonmetallic mineral
(including cement, -2.6 percent), iron/steel and Other basic metals
(-6.4 percent), and electrical machinery (-1 1.2 percent). (Some of
20. Dataarefor firms with morethanfiveworkersfrom theAnnuaISurvey
of Manufacture_The1977AnnualSurveyincludedfor the firsttime firms with
lessthanfive workersbut these werenotseparated out fromthelargerfirms,
Heavyindustries include the lasttwo groups pluspaper andpaper products and
comprise33 percent of totalmanufacturing value added(in currentprices) in
1956.Thisshare roseto43 percent in 1974.26 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE S
GROWTH RATESOF REAL OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND REAL
OUTPUT PER WORKER IN NONMANUFACrURING
INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES, PHILIPPINES, 19S6.79
(In Percent)
19S6-60 1960-70 1970-79 1960-79 1956-79
Growthof RealOutput
Miningandquarrying 4.4 8.4 7.7 8.1 7.4
Construction 0.2 2.7 15.4 8.7 7.2
Electricityand publicutilities 3.9 4.1 8.9 6.4 5.9
Transportation,communicatioh
and storage 5.1 5.2 9.4 7.2 6.8
Total nonmanufactoring 2.7 4.6 11.4 7.8 6.9
Growthof Employment
Miningandquarrying 9.1 4.1 8.6 6.2 6.7
Construction 4.8 6.6 4.4 5.6 5.4
Electricityand publicutilities 7.0 4.3 12.3 8.1 7.9
Transportation,,communication
and storage 4.7 6.0 5.1 5.6 5.4
Total nonmanufacturing 5.0 6,1 5.3 5.7 5,6
Growthof R_aJOutputper
Worker
Miningand quarrying -4.3 4.1 -1.8 -t.3 0.3
Construction -6.8 -").7 10.5 3.6 1.8
Electricityand publicutilities -3.0 --0.2 --2.7 --1.4 --1.7
Transportation, communication
andstorage 0.4 -0.7 2.1 0.6 0.6
Total nonmanufacruring -3,4 -0.9 5.4 2.1 1.1
Growth of RealOutput
O.)mmerce 6.6 4.3 4.4 4.3 5.1
Personalandother services 10,0 5,6 5.5 5.6 7.0
Government service 5.5 4,4 4.4 4.4 4.8
Total Services 6.9 4,6 4.6 4.6 5,4
Growth Employment
Commerce 6,9 6.2 4.9 5,6 6.0
Personalandother services 4,4 5.2 5.0 5.1 4.9
Governmentservice 4.1 6.0 4.7 5.4 4.9
Total Services 4.1 5.5 4.8 5.2 4.8
Growth of RealOutput per Worker
Commerce -0.3 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5
Personaland other services 4.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 1.4
Government service 1.3 -3.7 -0.1 -2.0 -0.9
Total Services 2,7 -1.5 -0,2 0.9 0.4
Sources:Official NEDA estimateson nationalaccount and employment as'
taken from jose A. B. Bulao,The Growth of GovernmentServlFeSectorin the
Philippines(1946-1976) and NEDA 1982 PhilippineStatisticalYearbook.Tables
A_I, A-2 and A-3 of Lucia C Laquindanum,The PostwarGrowth of LaborPro-
ductivity in the Non-manufacturlngIndustl'les,updatedwith official estimates
in NEDA 1982 PhilippineStatisticalYeafboolcOSHIMA: SECTORSOURCESOF PHILIPPINE POSTWARGROWTH 2'7
these declines are so largethat one must not leave out the possibility
that there is something wrong with the data collected in the Annual
Survey of Manufacturing.) Nevertheless, one notes that the problems
of all six industries are included for extended discussion in the recent
IBRD volume, Philippines: Industrial Development Strategy and
Policies.21
That volume also notes that manufacturing in the Philippines is
highly concentrated in Manila: "in 1975, some 73% of manufac-
turing value added and 65% of employment was located in Manila
and the surrounding provinces. If the resource-basedfood and manu-
facturing industries are excluded, the share of manufacturing value
added in Manila and environs rises to 87%." (Pages19-20.) In Tai-
want, the 1971 economic census reported that 31 percent of manu-
facturing employment was concentrated in Taipei City and 43 per=
cent in Taipei province (including Taipei City). With such concentra-
tion, it is not to be expected that nonagricultural employment for
farm family members is likely to increase much, especially since
industrial concentration implies that services used by industries will
also be concentrated in and around Manila.
V. THE SERVICE SECTOR
The service sector, including commercial, personal and public
services, grows mainly in response to domestic industrialization and
the commercialization of a country's agriculture in the early stages
of development. Only secondarily is its growth propelled by exports,
largely services rendered to tourists and to foreign business, and
services to the growing urbanized population. Thus, its growth comes
close to some kind of a weighted averageof the growth of the agri-
cultural and industrial sector, although this is not the case with
city-states (such as Singapore and Hong Kong where service export
assumesconsiderable importance and has "a life of its own") and
with the more developed economies.
Statistics of the service sector's constant product and employ-
ment have various limitations, the most important of which are the
difficulty of deflating the product component and of collecting good
income data from the large number of small units in the personal
21. This report was the productof a field surveyby a largemissionof
industrialeconomists andengineers headedby B. A. de Vriesin February1979
andpublishedin Washington,D.C., 1980 - a first of its kind by specialists
versed in international comparative workin industrialization of LDC's.28 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and •commercial sectors and the irregularity of employment.22
Hence, the figures in Tables 2, 3, and 13 must be taken as rough
magnitudesof tendencies.InTable 3, the Philippines, togetherwith
Indonesia, registered the lowest growth of productivity for the
period 1960-79, 2.1 percent, as compared with •4.4 percent for
Southeast Asia and 4.0 percent for East Asia, but higher than 1.4
percent for South Asia. But if•we take a longer period, from 1950
to 1979, the growth rate is even lower, 0.4 percent (Table 13). If
this is traced to the three subsectors,both commerce and govern-
ment had negative productivity growths,-0;5 percentand-0.9 per-
cent respectively,while personalserviceshad a positive 1.4 percent.
Apparently, labor productivity in all the servicesdid not make much
headway. Particularly.disturbing is the stagnation in the commerce
and government sectors which are sostrategically important in the
generation of externalities to the commodity producing sectors.'
This poor performance of theservices is to be expected'for countries
where the commodity-producing sectors do not do well. Under
conditions of rapid increase in the labor supply, the unwanted
workers move to the services in the informal sectors, clogging up
the labor market, bringing wagesdown, overstaffing the businessand
creating excess capacities.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF SLOW GROWTH OF PRODUCT
AN D PROD UCTIVITY
Partly asa statistical checkl and partly becausethere are impor-
tant connections between low growth of per capita GNP in the long
run and other factors, we presentTable 9. The connections between
the growth of productivity, structural changes,income distribution
and personal savings,and birth rates in seculargrowth are discussed
in detail in my paper, "A.Model of Postwar EastAsian Growth and
Structural Changes," cited previously, and here we shall be very
brief.
The figures in Table 9 are consistent with the productivity
results obtained and the expected consequences on changes in
structure, income distribution, savings and fertility. Structural
change (movement toward higher income sector) issluggishin the
22. See"Postwar Growthof theService Sector in AsianCountries,"Phi/-
ipplne Reviewof Economicsand Business(September/December 1979), pp.
23-30,foramoredetailed discussion. Seealsotheappended statistical note.OSHIMA: SECTOR SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 29
TABLE 9
COMPARATIVE CHANGES IN VARIOUS INDEXES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES
Crude Personal
Birth rate Saving
per 1,000 Distribution of GDP aspercent of
population Agri- Industry Services p_rsonal
culture income
Philippines (1960) 46.0 26.0 28.0 46.0 10.4 (1)
(1980) 34.0 23.0 37.0 40.0 10.0 (2)
growth rate per
year in percent ._- 1.5 0.6 1.4 -- 0.7 -- 0.4
Malaysia (1960) 45,0 37,0 18.0 45.0 n, a.
(1980) 31.0 24.0 37.0 39.0 n .a.
Growth rate per
year in percent - 1.8 - 2.1 - 3.7 - 0.7
Thailand (1960) 44.0 40.0 19.0 41.0 12.9 (1)
1980) 30.0 25.0 29.0 46.0 15.1 (2)
Growth rate per
year in percent --- 1.9 - 2.3 2.1 0.6 1.6
Indonesia (1960) 46.0 54.0 14.0 32.0 n.a.
(1980) 35,0 26.0 42,0 32,0 n.a.
Growth rate per
year in percent -1.4 -3.6 5,7 0.0
South Korea (1960) 43,0 37,0 20.0 43.0 2.4 (1)
(1980) 24,0 16.0 41,0 43,0 9.5 (2)
Growth rate per year in - 2.9 - 4.1 3.7 0.0 14,7
percent
Taiwan (1960) 40.0 33.0 25.0 42.0 11.0 (1)
• (1980) 23.0 10.0 46,0 44.0 18.7 (2)
Growth rate per
year in percent - 2.7 - 5.8 3.1 0.2 5.5
India (1960) 44,0 50.0 20.0 30.0 8.3 (1)
(1980) 36.0 37.0 26.0 37.0 9.2 (2)
Growth rate per
• year in percent - 1.0 -1,5 1.3 1.1 1.0
Sources: Data on birth rates and structure of GDP from IBRD World Develop-
ment Report 1982, personal saving rates computed from official income pub-
lication of each country.
Notes: (1) Average for 1960's, (2) Average for 1970's.30 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Philippinescompared with other countries except India (with lower
growth of productivity). If agricultural productivity is slow, the
release of farm labor to the industrial sector is low, even if the
increase in the labor supply exceeds labor needs. The unwanted
workers must seek low productivity jobs in the services where
neither cropland (as in agriculture) nor fixed capital (asin industry)
is needed, particularly in the informal sector.23 In the caseof Taiwan
and South Korea, after full employment, there was an acceleration
of farm mechanization which freed workers during the peak seasons
of rice growing and which made possible the large migrations and
sharp fall in the farm labor force. These countries thus have moved
into the industrial society with industrial labor force exceeding
agriculture labor force. This was not the case in Southeast Asia
(Table 9).
Expanding yields, multiple cropping and off-farm employment
raisednot only the annual productivity of averagefarm families but
also the employment (throughout the year) of the membersof farm
families, particularly among the peasantswith small amounts of
cropland and hence with a surplusof idlehandsduringslack seasons.
As the faster growth of farm family incomes over the growth of
labor supply continued on, full employment was reached. Wagesof
unskilled workers in the economy rose and more family members
were able to obtain jobs in the city so that in both the rural and
urban areasthe incomesin the lower brackets rosefaster than those
in the upper group. The distribution of income became favorable
with full employment and accelerated mechanization of unskilled
workers. The Gjni coefficients in Southeast Asia are substantially
higher than those in East Asia, and perhaps one of the highest is
that for the Philippines, although good data are very difficult to
get in this area.m Perhaps,the lower growth of product per worker
over product per capita via various connections (discussedin the
Appendix Note) contributed to worseningincome inequality.
23. See "Postwar Growth of the Service Sector," pp. 20-21, for this hypo-
thesis. See alsoTidalgo and Jurado (1976).
24. See recent data on income distribution in my note in Ehonomi dan
Keuangan Indonesia(Economy andFinance in Indonesia), March 1982;forwage
data,seeMalayanEconomicReview,April 1982,for my paper entitled"Arthur
Lewis' DualisticModel." The papershowsthat wages beganto risewith pro-
ductivitylongbeforefull employmentwasreached in EastAsia.OSHIMA: SECTOR SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 31
Despite the equalizing tendencies,personalsavingsroseto new
heightsassavingsin East Asia becamemore a function of sustained
growth than the other way around. Householdswere compelled to
savefor small machinesand equipment in agricultqre and industry
as wagesof unskilled workers rose, the labor market becametight,
and competition to survive or expand began to heat up. Workers'
households began to savein order to send their children to high
school and beyond, to meet the demandsof th machine: and other
science-based technologies- which alsobeganto lower the demand
for unskilled and semiskilled workers relative to skilled workers.
No country in Southeast Asia reached this stage, least of all the
Philippines,although Malaysiawas rapidly approachingfull employ-
ment just before the world depression. Personalsavingsrates fell
in the Philippines from the 1960's to the 1970's while they rose
slowly in the others (Table 9).
The contributions of secular growth to demographic behavior
are extensive and diverse. Some of these from the foregoing are:
the risein educationalexpensesof childrenand the opportunity costs
of rearingchildren with higher female participation in the farm and
working classesand the reduction in benefits due to incomesfore-
gone as teenagersspent more time in schools.Also, with sustained
full employment and rising incomes, working class parents and
peasants purchased protection in the future for themselves in the
form of land and homes,and private and public insuranceon health
and retirement. This reduced the value of children for their future
security as they grow older and becomeunable to earnan income,
The Philippines, along with Indonesia and India, had the lowest
decline in crude birth rates as the growth of incomes especially
among the lower income groups slowed down; with the highest
declines in Taiwan and South Korea (and Japan, Hongkong and
Singapore,not shownin Table 9).
The reduction in fertility in turn, contributed to the lower
growth of the labor force in the next generationwhich madefurther
mechanization and capital-intensification .both possibleand neces-
sary. Accordingly, this and other consequencesbecamecausesfor
further .productivity rises,not only in the caseof fertility but also
in the structural shifts to higher incomes,better income distribu-
tion (domesticdemand) and highersavings .2s
25. Demographic aspects arediscussed in my paper,"_Fertility Trendsin
Postwar East andSoutheast Asia,"mimeographed, February 1983.32 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Vt SUMMARY AND RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS
The statistical findings show that Philippine growth of labor
productivity in the past two decadesfor the economy and sectors
was low, probably one of the lowest in East and Southeast Asian
countries for which we have long-term series,but higherthan South
Asia. Total factor productivity alsogrew slowly. These findings are
the resultsof the first round of studieson Philippine seculargrowth,
conducted by graduate students at the UP School of Economics,
supplemented by available data from various sources, largely for
comparative purposes.
As we implied in the beginning, the cumulative impact of long-
term forces on the present can be compelling. The consequences
of low growth of productivity are not unrelated to the fact that
the present world crisis has hit this country the hardest among
Asian countries, Besidesconsequencesfor the distribution of family
incomes (seethe Appendix Note), the low growth of productivity
in a number of major subsectors must have contributed to low
profit rates, savingsand capital expansion in these major Sectors,
forcing many to borrow heavily from private and public banks, and
some to become bankrupt, with unfavorable consequencesfor the
national budget. The slow rate of expansion meant a lower absorp-
tion of the labor force, contributing to unemployment and under-
employment. Low productivity growth must have alsocontributed
to the stagnation and even decline of real wageswhich, together
with the slow growth of employment, added to the social unrest
and misery of the lower income groups. Their low purchasing power
contributed to the sluggishgrowth of the home market for manufac-
tures. This, in turn, slowed down the growth of scale economies;
and with the poor showing of commerce, transport and public ser-
vices, the external economies generated were meager, if any. As
a result of all these, together with the slow growth of internal econ-
omies implied by the low growth of productivity in several major
industries, efficiency must have, grown too slowly for a number of
export or potentially export industries. The adverse effect on the
balance of payments must have beensubstantial. Most important, all
these, together with the slow changesin structure, income distribu-
tion, and birth rates noted previously, contributed to the low growth
of GNP per capita in the long run and must havesomething to do
with the zero growth of GNP per capita in 1982. If these are someOSH_.IMA: SECTOR SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE POSTWAR GROWTH 33
of the consequences,the raising of productivity must have high
priorities for long-rangeplanning.
Although productivity growth has beengenerally low across.
the-board asto subsectorsand sectors,there are some major indus-
tries with surprisingly poor performance. If theseindustriescan be
made to improve their performance, the overall growth of the econ-
omy can be substantiallyraisedfor the 1980's and beyond. It may,
therefore, be of interest to discuss briefly a possiblesecondround of
researchwhich can be undertaken. Having now identified the weak
spots in the Philippine economy, I believethat the emphasisshould
be on in-depth industry studieswith the purposeof identifying the
forcesand mechanismswhich have contributed to slow growth and
with a view to arriving at feasible policy suggestions.In agriculture,
corn, coconut andsugarcane should be looked at more closely but
not rice since it is extensively studied at IRRI and I_osBa_os;in
industry, segments of textiles, leather, wood, cement, steel, elec-
tricity, and electricalmachinery needto bestudied.
In speculatingabout issuesand hypothesesto be dealt with in
these industry studies, one can say that there are now a few good
basicindustrial studiesto useasguidelines.Besidesthe IBRD noted
above, there is the study by R. M. Bautista, John H. Power and
Associates,Industrial Promotion Policies in the Philippines, with
detailed estimation of the domestic resource cost and effective
rates of protection for recent years, analyses of fiscal incentives ,
and industry studiesfor leather, car manufacturing, pulp/paper and
small industries. (Soon a work on the domestic resourcecost of
agriculture will be completed.) The IBRD volumelooks into manage-
ment and technologies in steel, mechanical engineering,textiles,
food processing, cement, garments, furniture, leather, footwear
and small industries. Also recently published are the comparative
results of a three-year project of the Institute of Developing Econ-
omies in Tokyo on six industriesin five Asian countries(Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,and Thailand).28
One issue that emerges from these studies can be stated as
follows: granted the major importance of the totality of policies
making UP the structure of incentivesin constrainingthe growth of
productivity in the Philippine industries,how do thesework insome
of the industriesspecified aboveto producelow ratesof productivity
growth? What are the interrelations betweeen incentives policies
26.These area partof 30countryreports withoneoverall report.34 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
of various sorts and entrepreneurship/management? Usingthe corn-
putations from the Bautista/Power volume, the IBRD report shows
that there is a good deal of association between high effective pro-
tection and high domestic resource, costs (and. conversely low pro-
tection and low costs).27 It isplausibleto draw the linesof causation
from protection to costsbut it may be interesting .to study.the pos-
sibilities of the reverse: high costs (due to poor management, indus-
trial relations, etc.) leading the industry to demand (and-getting)
continued protection. Although the Philippines had a good headstart
in industrialization in the 1950's, the enterprises were apparently
unable to dispense with protection by .the early 1960's, unlike the
late starters such as Taiwan and South Korea. Why was it so? For
one thing, Taiwan and South Korea (and also Hong Kong and Singa-
pore) witnessed the large inflow of experienced entrepreneursfrom
outside in the 1950's.
Moreover, there are a few casesof high protection and low do-
mestic resource costs (slaughtering and poultry dressing, metal
cans, boxes, and containers) and .many casesof low protection and
high domestic resource costs (glass, glassproducts, hand tools, gene-
ral hardware, basic, industrial chemicals, several wood products ,
cordage, twine and net industries). 28 These need closer study to
identify the forces involved, including product quality which is
difficult to take into account in quantitative measuresof protection
and resource costs. Then, there are the casessuch as in the garment
industries where export quotas are partially filled only, even though
there are no inhibiting trade, fiscal and financial policies.
The reason for raising the issue of interplay between incentive
policies and entrepreneurship/management is the finding of Mamoru
Tsuda who interviewed nearly one hundred Japanese-Filipino joint
ventures in the mid-1970's, most of which were large firms interested
in exporting part or all of their output. Tsuda (1978) found that
Japanese managers of the joint ventures (most of which were con-
trolled 70/30 or 60/40 by Filipino management) were appalled
by the management style displayed by Filipinos - highly authorita-
rian decision-making; irrational nepotism; '.'contemptuous" attitudes
toward their workers; windfall, short-term profit making; heavy
27.The IBRD reportshowsaSpearman rankcorrelation between thetwo
of 0.65.
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draining of profits out of the enterprises - which was almost the
complete opposite of the Japanese management style (now widely
studied by other countries). 29 Recent disclosures largely confirm
Tsuda's findings, as a number of Japanese enterprises have pulled
out of the joint ventures. 3°
Another subject that needs to be studied is the "cascading" of
costs including quality from upper to lower stream industries, e.g.,
leather to leather products, pulp to paper products and to printing/
publishing, lumber to wood products, cement to construction, tex-
tiles to garments, steel making to can making and to food processing,
home appliances, hand-tools, etc. These lower-stream industries are
some of the major employment and export generation sectors.
Industrial development policies must focus on them (and at the same
time support agriculture), and not on iron-making, alumina-smelting,
or naphtha-cracking - the markets, capital; and technology of which
are not within the reach of the Philippines for some tine to come.
Philippine manufacturing may be excessively capital-intensive; data
on value added per worker from another study will show that it isas
high as in South Korea and Taiwan, 50 percent higher than Thailand
and three times that of Indonesia. (Forthcoming study of Thai post-
war growth.)
Other topics for the industry studies are excess capacity and
underutilization which seem to have been extensive in Philippine
industry throughout the decades. Part of the causes of these can be
traced to government policies, and part to the efficiency of manage-
ment, especially in technical aspects, but there may be others.
These and other topics (degree of competition , the impact of
public policies, etc.) can best be researched through industry studies
since the underlying forces and mechanisms constraining product-
29. SeealsoTsuda'sPreliminary Study of Japanese-FilipinoJoint Ventures,
Foundationfor NationalistStudies,1978.
30. SeeBusinessDay, December2, 1982, p.2 on foreignbusiness withdraw-
ing from the Philippines,and alsothe report by Vicente R. Jaymeof PDCP,
quoted in BusinessDay, November29, 1982, to theeffect that mismanagement
of borrowedfunds kas been extensivewith large corporations.Jaime Ongpin
talksabout the "windfall mentality" in the Philippineminingindustry(Asian
Wall Street Journal, November9, 1982). In the BellCommissionReport,made
in 1948 before many of the import substitutionmeasures of the 1950's went
into effect, complaintsabout poor managementare extensiveand similar to
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ivity advances are both quantitative and qualitative, and they inter-
act in ways too complex to be econometrically measured and ana-
lyzed cross-sectionally. Some of the basic forces may be long-term
(such as entrepreneurial philosophies) and the product of long
stretches of time, and will require longitudinal information. Hope-
fully, these and other studies should help in working out better ways
of designing and executing industrial and agricultural development
policies which, in most countries of Asia, are still in the embryonic
stage. And yet (in my view) the very heart of a national development
plan must always be the agricultural and industrial plan and policies.
Without a good set of agricultural and industrial planning and poli-
cies, no development planning can succeed. It may be for this reason
that the enormous increases in Philippine government spending
represented by the sixfold increase in the number of government
employees per 1,000 population from prewar to postwar years have
only produced a disappointing rise in productivity of around 2 per-
cent. 31
In the West, Kuznets found that the interplay of technological
and institutional changes was the underlying factor in its rapid
growth over the past two centuries. In the case of developing coun-
tries today, institutional changes are of paramount importance in
the interplay largely because most new technologies can be easily
imported from abroad. But in the adoption, spread, effective and
efficient use of the imported technologies, it is institutions which
are crucial. And even for Japan, a relatively developed country in
the 1950's and 1960's, I have found thatit is changes in institutions
which are vital for the rapid import and effective use of the new
technologies. And among the institutions, it is those which deal
with manpower development, skills, work habits and attitudes
that figure the most. Postwar japan has been able to develop insti-
31. The postwarfigure for 1975 is 25 per thousand,andthis isfrom Bulao
(1981); the prewar figure for 1927 is 4.2 per thousand, computed from the
Statistical Bulletin of the Philippines Islands, 1928. Aside from industrial and
agriculture development policies, these figures raise the question: how much
external economies havegovernment activities created?How much of them have
been nothing more than zero sum games?Perhapsthere may be a need for an
extensive study of government productivity. For a new system of industrial
policy, seeChalmers Johnson, MITI and the JapaneseMiracle, 1982. This book,
however, tends to exaggeratethe importance of industrial policy on Japanese
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tutions in the workplace which have been able to raise the motiva-
tion of manpower at all levels (from top management down to the
janitors) to excel. 32 After a decade of stay in the Philippines, with
much travel in East and Southeast Asia in connection with research
on manpower, I have a strong impression that many of the institu-
tions of the Philippines are not suitable for the vast majority of the
people, particularly as relating to management, industrial relations,
and public administrations. Perhaps a major study on the suitability
of these institutions would be appropriate.
Appendi_c Note on NationalAccountingDatafor ProductivityStudies
How rough the estimatesof overall productivity are for the economy as
a whole (2 percent per worker) and for the three major sectors(A, I, S) may be
seenin the following:
For the agricultural sector, the minor food crops suchasvegetables,beans,
peas, roots crops, peanuts, fruits, and various miscellaneouscrops produced in
the "backyard" and in home gardensare known to be poorly estimated (because
of sparsedata, especially for the 1950's and 1960's) and these comprised per-
haps one-fifth of the gross value of total crop production in 1971. Similar
difficulties exist in the estimatesfor livestock (including poultry), fishing, and
forestry especially for the 1950's and 1960's. Very rough coefficients and para-
metersare usedto estimate those portions of the sectors not coveredby annual
sourcesof data, and these comprise a substantial part of value added of the
sectors. Thus, the large increase in productivity shown for "other crops" in
Table 6 and the growth for noncrop agriculture are of limited valuefor analysis.
(See Manual on the Philippine System of National Accounts, Framework,
Sources and Methods, NEDA, Manila, 1977, and the Appendix volume of the
Manual on undercoveragein the livestock sector, page7.)
As for the nonagricultural sector, the sourcesof data are no better for the
small, unorganized or informal sector, which in 1972 comprised about three-
fifths of nonagricultural employment, or about 2.9 million out of 5.1 million.
The figure of 2.9 million wasobtained by deducting from the employment totals
of the 1972 Labor Force Survey the employment from the 1972 Censusof
Establishments for the respective sectors, obtaining the following: manufac-
turing, 760,000; transport; storage and communication, 270,000; mining and
quarrying, 4,000; construction, 390,000; commerce, 520,000; and personal
services,910,000.
In the case of manufacturing, the number employed in the unorganized
sector was multiplied by the quinquennial Censusof Establishments'grossvalue
32. "Reinterpreting Japan'sPostwarGrowth," Economic Development and
Cultural Change(October 198,2).38 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
added per worker among firms with 1 to 4 workers. Since this Census covered
only a small portion of the unorganized manufacturing sector; the problem con-
cerning the repr_esentativeness of the value added estimate arises. May it not be
too high if one assumes that the small firms reporting in the Census may be the
better organized, more efficient, higher value-added firms than those not re-
porting? Since in the unorganized sector most of the firms are operating irregu-
larly (depending on the season and business conditions), the annual value added
may not be high. Similar •procedures are followed in the commerce and service
sectors where the unorganized sectors are very large and difficult to include
in surveys because of their mobility and lack of fixed business location
(peddlers, vendors, stallkeepers, domestic servants, and so on). It is difficult
to evaluate how representative the assumed value added per worker may be for
the irregular work force (comprising 30 percent) of total employment in the
nonagricultural sector), although it is clear from poverty studies that those in the
unorganized sectors are the.poorest in nonagriculture.
The growth rate of private employee compensation (per worker in constant
prices) of those employed in both the organized and the unorganized sectors
(2.9 million discussed above andthe 2.2 million covered in the 1972 Census of
Establishments) from 1971 to 1980 is computed from the national accounts to
be around 3 percent per year. (We have deducted from total employee compen-
sation in the household account the employee compensation in the government
sector.) But from Table 7, based on the annual surveys of manufacturing, there
appears to be stagnation in the growth of •output from the organized sector.
(And this conclusion is consistent with recent findings of falling real wages in
the 1970's by various economists. See, for example, Leepak Lal, Wages and
Employment in the Philippines, IBRD, Washington, 1978.) The issue thus
emerges: is the growth of the real value added per worker in the unorganized
manufacturing and other nonagriculturalsectors too high in the national
accounts? _It does not seem plausible that the small•, ill,quipped, underfinanced,
poorly managed, low-paying firms in the unorganized sectors can be growing
more rapidly than the organized sector in any of the industries noted above.
If this was indeed the case, there is something drastically wrong with the orga-
nized sector with all of its advantages in financing, management, scale econ-
Omies, and externalities. 1
• 1. See the appendix table on the details of computation in the above dis=
cussion. Part of the difference between changes in real wage rates and annual
compensation per employee could be an increase in average hours, days, and
weeks of wo.r_kor aggregate annual hours of work. But the available data do not
show any significant changes•in underemployment during the 1970's. Incident-
ally, technically speaking, a substantial part of value added per worker in the
unorganized sector as estimated in the accounts should be c!assified as pro-
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Part of the difference betweenchangesin realwageratesand annualcom.
pensationper employeemay be dueto an increasein averagehours,days,and
weeksof work (or aggregate annual hoursof work) per employed person.The
data on underemploymentare not adequatesincethesurveyspertain at mostto
a few months of the year. And for the few months coveredby thesesurveys,
the availabledata do not showany si_ificant changesin the aggregate annual
hoursof work during the 1970's.'Thus, there is a needto resolvethe puzzle
posedby the 3 percentrisein the growthrateof privateemployeecompensation
in constant pricesfrom the national accountsand the fall in real wagesfrom
thewagestatistics.
_C)n the basisof the findingsof this paper,oneway to resolve the puzzlemay
be as follows. First, the growth of averageemployeecompensation in the na-
tional accounts in the 1970's is probably overstatedsince nonwagecompen.
sation(suchasemployer contribution to socialsecurity) and increases inaggre-
gateannualhoursof work did not changesufficientlyover the period.Second,
even if we grant that averageannual employee compensation,especiallyof
unskilledworkers, in the late 1960's and early 1970's wasno higherthan sub-
sistencelevel,it could havefallen perhaps10 percent or so if the numberof
earnersper family rose to offset the fall in the real wagesof the main earner
of the family, thereby maintaining family incomes around the subsistence
level.
From 1971 to 1980, the number of employed personsrose from 11.6
to 17.2 million and the numberof privatefamiliesfrom 6.:3to 8.6 million for
the Philippinesasa whole, resultingin employed persons per family increasing
from 1.83 to 2.00. For the urbansector,the latter rosefrom 1.98 to 2.17 per-
sonsper family, or roughly10 percent. 3
This increasein the number of earnersperfamily wastheresult of an ex-
ceptional rise of employment whichgrew between1970 and 1979 at a rateof
S.1percent per year (which compareswith 3.1 percentfor Thailand).This in
turn wasassociatedwith the risein participationrate of the workingagepopu-
lation (15 years and over) from 55.5 to 62.8 percent.One mayconjecturethat
falling or stagnatingreal wagesof the main earnermayhaveinducedhousewives
and others into the labor market to maintain subsistencelevelsof income. But
there was also an accelerationin the growth of the working-agepopulation
(due to the populationexplosionof the 1960's and 1950's).Working-age popu-
lation grew at a rateof 3.3 percentcomparedto the growth of the laborforce
of 4.7 percent. (The difference between 4.7 percentandthe $.1 percentin
2. Incidentally,technicallyspeakinga substantialportionof valueaddedper
worker in the unorganizedsectorshould be classifiedas proprietors' income,
not asemployeecompensation, aspublishedin the offidial nationalaccounts.
3. Employed personsfrom NCSO Bulletin on Labor Forceand Employ-
ment (mimeographed);numberof families from Family Income and Expend-
iture Survey for 1971 andCensusof Populotlon for 1980.40 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
employmentincrease represents thereductionin theunemploymentrate.)4
If productivity were not doing so poorly, real wageswould be rising,the
participation rate would not haverisenso much, and more of the population
15 years and over mighthavecontinuedschooling,etc., until full employment
shall havebeen approached,aswas the caseof japan in the 1950's, Taiwan in
the 1960's, and South Korea and Malaysia in the latter 1970's, even though
there wasalsoan acceleratingrisein thelabor supply of thesecountries.Inthe
Philippines,the failure of productivity to rise kept wageslow and forcedthe
population reaching working age levelsand housewivesto seek employment,
reinforcingfrom thesupply sidethe tendencyof realwagesto sa_5
One other implication of the foregoingfindings may be briefly noted.
Family surveydata on incomesare difficult to interpret, but if we acceptthe
abovefindings,their implicationson the trend of income distributionfrom the
1960's to the 1970's may beasfollows.
If the additional worker in the householdcompensatedfor the declinein
the real earningsof the householdhead,then there was little or no gain in
the total incomesof householdsin the lower bracketsof the distribution.
Hence, much of the increasein per capitaincome (and hence per family in-
comes) shown in the national accountsdata may have gone to the upper
incomebrackets.This meansthat the shareof the lower incomegroupsgrew
more slowly in the 1970's than in the 1960's, indicatinga wideningin family
income disparities.This is partially supported by the fact that the average
personalsavingsfrom the nationalaccountshavequadrupledfrom the 1960's
to the1970's while prices haveonly tripled. If we assumethat positivesavings
come'mainly from the upper income bracketsand very little from the lower
brackets(clearlyshown in the 1971 and 1966 family incomeand expenditur e
surveyswhich report that the lower half of the income groupshave nega.tive
savings),then the increasedpositivesavings may have come from the rising
shareof the upperincomegroups.
Similar conclusionsmay be obtained from the data from the national
accounts,which show that the shareof corporateincomesin nationalincome
rose from an averageof 4.4 percentin the 1960's to 6.0 percentin the 1970's
and that the rest of incomes(mainlyemployeecompensationand proprietor's
income) fell from 95.4 to 93.5 percent.If what has beensaidaboveon wages
'and employee compensationis valid, then the drop in the shareof the non-
corporateincomeswill be evenlargerand the riseof the corporatesharelarger
than shown in the accounts.(Unfortuna_ly there is no breakdownbetween
employeecompensationand proprietor'sincome for the 1960's.) If we assume
that the urban proprietors' shaFewas not decreasingmore rapidly than the
numberof urbanproprietors, the rise in the shareof corporate incomeandthe
4. All data from NCSO Bulletin on Lobor Force.
S, Seethediscussion ondualistictheoriesin the Mal¢,t_nEconomic Review,
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APPENDIX TABLE
METHODSOF COMPUTINGTHE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN,LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATES IN ORGANIZED AND UNORGANIZED
MANUFACTURING SECTORS
I. FromAnnual Surveyof Manufacturing1977 (establishments with 5 or
moreworkers)
Census Implicit Census Real
Value price value value
added indexfor addedin Total added Annual
(P1,000) manufac. 1972 employ- perworker growth
turing Prices ment (P1,000) rates
1968 4,490,450 62.5 7,184,720 394,336 18.22
1973 11,225,469 116.1 9,668,793 537,944 17.97 -0.3%





in 1972 prices Employment (P1,000) rates
1968 10,478 1,234,000 8.49
1973 15,252 1,396,000 0.93 5.2%
III. Growthrateof GDP perworker:establishments with lessthan5workers
(1) Contribution of establishmentwith 5 or more workersto real GDP/
worker = -0.3% x 0.354 (averageshare of establishmentswith
5or moreworkers intotal employment,1968and1973)
= -0.106%
(2)Contribution ofestablishment withless than5 workers toreal GDP/
worker --5.2%- (-0.106%)
-- 5.31%





Note: 0.646 is the average shareof establishments with lessthan 5 workersin
total employment,1968and 1973.42 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT!
fall in the shareof employee compensation (withthe numberof employees
rising)will imply increasing "within" variances in the familyincomedistribu-
tion.
Moreover, within theemployee group, disparities mayhavebeen widenin_
Datafrom the CentralBankshowthatrealwages in nonagriculture havebeen
fallingat anannual rateof 2.8 percent between 1969and1979whilerealsala-
rieshavebeenfallingat a lowerrateof 1.9 percent. Andwithinthewage earn-
ing group,realwages of unskilled workershavebeenfailingat a rateof 6.2
percent compared to afall of 5.4 percent for theskilledworkers. 6 If thesize
of the salaried, skilled andunskilled workers group isnotdeclining, theseresults
showthat withinthe employeepopulation, disparities were rising, with the
lowest income receivers getting less. (Thisanalysis couldbemademoreconclu-
siveif dataonproprietors' incomes canbemadeavailable for the 1960'sfrom
theunpublished worksheets fromtheproduction accounts.)
Postscript
The foregoing, originally written a year ago- before the current
crisis of the Philippines -- fails to take note of one other possible
culprit in the poor performance of the economy over the past
decades. And this is the prospect of rampant misallocation of funds
borrowed abroad which now are reported to be over $20 billion.
With so much funding from abroad, its efficient utilization should
have enabled the economy to be doing as well as the other ASEAN
countries which have borrowed for lessper capita-wise. These huge
debts will prove to be a heavy drag on the performance of the
economy for the rest of the 1980's if adequate steps are not taken
now for their proper liquidation.
Steps to bail out the faltering firms may worsen matters, since
inefficiencies will be perpetuated and moreborrowing will be needed
for future rescue operations, as may be the case in countries-like
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. Such rescueoperations may be normal
procedures in Communist countries but the rules of the capitalist
game are to penalize inefficiencies by letting them go bankrupt,
their physical assets sold tothe other more efficient firms which
move in to take on the businessthat the bankrupt firms usedto do.
To carry out the added business, the efficient firms hire most of the
staff of the bankrupt firms, leaving the inefficient managers and
6. CentralBankdataonwages from itsStatisticalBulletin, 1979have been
deflated bytheManila consumer priceindex.OSHIMA: SECTOR SOURCESOF PHILIPPINE POSTWARGROWTH 43
other staff members to look for jobs paying lower remuneration.
Very few personsare hurt except stockholdersand the inefficient•
(who may hustle to becomemore•efficient in the future) and society
is:better off for the bankruptcy becauseof improved, overall effi-
ciencies. It is rules such as this which enable capitalist economies
to develop productivity so much better than communisteconomies,
and the latter areincreasinglybecomingawareof them (for example,
China hasrecently dropped its"iron bowl" philosophy).
Nevertheless,some firms do get into trouble through no fault
of their own. Hence, there isa need to study each casethoroughly,
including the scale of the misallocations,and how they occurred,
if only to avoid them in the future. These misallocations have
occurred too often in the past decades;and without a good study
and the adoption of policiesto preventthem in the future, foreign
funds will not be forthcoming in sufficient volume to raise pro-
ductivity in the future. This country has many topnotch business
executivesand academic economists to carry out sucha study and
come up with recommendationswhich may brighten the prospects
for the future.
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